|
Africa Policy Outlook 2004
Salih Booker and Ann-Louise
Colgan, January 29, 2004
In 2004, despite the fact that two
African-Americans occupy both of the major foreign policy posts in
the U.S. government, Washington will not give Africa the attention
it deserves and requires. The U.S.' Africa policy will continue to
be characterized by a duplicity that has emerged as the principal
hallmark of the Bush administration approach to the continent. On
the one hand, Africa's priorities are being marginalized and
undermined by a U.S. foreign policy preoccupied with other parts
of the world. On the other hand, the Bush White House is callously
manipulating Africa, claiming to champion the continent's needs
with its compassionate conservative agenda.
In the past year, the Bush
administration's foreign policy priorities have negatively
impacted upon Africa, both directly and indirectly. The U.S.
preoccupation with the “war on terrorism,” alleged weapons of
mass destruction, and Washington 's military misadventure in Iraq
, has hurt Africa directly in economic and political terms. The
White House has also turned Africa into geo-strategic real estate,
defining the continent's value in terms of oil and access to
military bases, and describing U.S.-Africa relations once more in
a cold war era model.
More broadly, to the extent that
U.S. actions undermine the very notion of multilateralism, they
are directly at odds with Africa 's interests. Africa 's
priorities--the fight against HIV/AIDS and poverty--are being
ignored, as U.S. unilateralism threatens the principle of
international cooperation.
At the same time, in the past year,
the Bush administration has sought to place Africa at the center
of its compassionate conservative agenda. Starting with the 2003
State of the Union promise on AIDS, and continuing with the
President's first trip to Africa in July, this Administration has
misled the people of the U.S., and the people of Africa. It claims
to be taking action on African priorities, while in reality it is
demonstrating the most negative leadership, masking broken
promises and harmful policies with high-sounding rhetoric.
Even the few new initiatives
announced by the President, on foreign aid and HIV/AIDS, are not
only under-funded; they are fundamentally flawed in their approach.
The Bush administration prefers to take a selective approach to
Africa policy, choosing a few African countries as eligible for
such initiatives, and thereby rewarding those whom the U.S.
unilaterally deems “worthy.” This strategy risks neglecting
those countries in most need of assistance. Moreover, it blocks
the emergence of a more comprehensive and coherent response to
Africa's challenges that are rooted in specific regional realities.
Such an approach is essential to addressing crises such as
HIV/AIDS and poverty.
These trends will continue to drive
U.S. relations with Africa in the year ahead. They will shape both
the priorities that emerge in the policies of the Bush
administration, and the challenges faced by Africa's people, and
by Africa advocates in this country. In this election year, it is
clear that foreign policy will be a major issue in the public eye.
It remains to be seen to what extent U.S. relations with Africa
will feature in the debate, and whether a new approach to today's
global challenges can emerge.
HIV/AIDS
The HIV/AIDS pandemic remains the
greatest challenge facing Africa , and the greatest global threat
to human security of our time. However, despite this reality, and
despite the lip service of the Bush administration, the lack of
U.S. leadership on this crisis is set to persist in 2004.
January sees the anniversary of the
$15 billion promise made by President Bush in last year's State of
the Union to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa & the Caribbean . This
initiative was already undermined by the President's own budget
request for 2004--only $450 million instead of the $3 billion
promised. Though Congress ultimately appropriated more than the
President's request, the Bush administration's betrayals on
HIV/AIDS policy are likely to continue in 2004.
The President's budget request for
U.S. funding for HIV/AIDS in Africa for 2005 should include at
least the $3 billion he promised per year in January 2003 under
the “President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief”, plus the
amount outstanding for the current year. Such an amount would
represent the U.S. fair share contribution toward the total
funding needed in Africa, and would fulfill the President's own
commitment. This is unlikely to materialize, however. Almost
immediately after the promise was made in January 2003 to provide
$15 billion in AIDS funding over 5 years to Africa and the
Caribbean, the White House broke this promise and made it a global
initiative. This marginalization of Africa will continue in 2004
with less than the $3 billion a year promised being stretched to
cover more than programs in Africa.
2004 also sees the launch of the
new U.S. Global AIDS Initiative, the new bureaucracy created by
the President's plan. This initiative, to be headed by former
pharmaceutical executive Randall Tobias, will compete with, and
may duplicate, the efforts of other much more important vehicles
such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS. It is likely to pose a
challenge in its approach, favoring prevention over treatment, and
its close ties with the pharmaceutical industry raise serious
questions about its commitment to ensuring low cost access to
treatment for HIV/AIDS programs in Africa. Although President Bush
has acknowledged that antiretroviral drugs are necessary, U.S.
policies continue to block African countries' efforts to acquire
such drugs at the lowest cost for their people.
The Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, now almost three years old, still faces
huge financial challenges, due in large part to the inadequate
support of the Bush administration. The U.S. has promised only
$200 million per year over the next five years--this is less than
one-tenth of what would represent the U.S. ' fair share. The
Global Fund hopes to announce its 4th round of grants in the
summer of 2004, though its ability to fund effective HIV/AIDS
programs in Africa and other poor regions will depend on its
financial stability. The Global Fund has the potential to increase
access to treatment in Africa tenfold in the next several years.
But the U.S. prefers to undermine this crucial vehicle, creating a
duplicative bureaucracy of its own to protect its unilateral bias.
In 2004, the broken promises of the
Bush administration on AIDS will likely continue. Meanwhile,
shocking new statistics on the impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa and
globally reveal how completely inadequate the response is. Popular
pressure in this country succeeded in forcing President Bush and
Congress to do more on HIV/AIDS in 2003. This pressure will
increase in 2004, particularly if the Bush White House attempts to
further backtrack on the commitments it has made to fund efforts
to fight this crisis.
The Bush administration has already
signaled its opposition to the “3 by 5” plan of the World
Health Organization (WHO). The WHO's groundbreaking initiation to
increase HIV/AIDS treatment for those requiring it was announced
on World AIDS Day, December 1st, 2003. It seeks to provide
medicines to (and save the lives of) 3 million people living with
HIV/AIDS who are not currently on treatment by 2005. Central to
this effort will be the distribution of drugs that provide a
cheaper and easier to use combination of three anti-retroviral
drugs in one pill, called fixed dose combinations. So far,
Washington has refused to support this approach.
Human Development
Africa faces huge human development
challenges, but the U.S. remains unwilling to make a real
commitment to support African efforts in this area. African
countries are striving to meet the Millennium Development
Goals--seeking to reduce hunger and poverty, and promote health
and education, in order to achieve the benchmarks set by the
United Nations in 2000. But the U.S.' failure to provide adequate
levels of development assistance undermines the ability of African
countries to meet these goals and to achieve a better life for
future generations.
In 2004, the Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) will be launched. This U.S. initiative, run by the
newly created Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), is intended
to increase U.S. foreign aid over the next three years, so that by
2006 an annual doubling of current levels will be achieved. In
2004, $1 billion has been appropriated for the MCA, which is
slightly less than what the President requested. Overall, however,
this initiative still proposes a far smaller increase in
assistance than the U.S. can and should provide. The U.S.
currently ranks at the bottom of all donor countries, with only
0.1% of GNP, or just over $10 billion, going to foreign aid
worldwide (roughly half or $5 billion for just the 2 countries of
Israel and Egypt). Only 1/100th of 1% of the U.S. budget ($1
billion) is spent on aid to sub-Saharan Africa. In this context,
when the U.S. is the wealthiest country in human history, the MCA
increase can only be seen as relatively meager.
Moreover, aid through the MCA will
be dealt out in a highly selective manner. Only a handful of
countries meeting certain economic and political criteria, defined
by Washington, will be eligible to receive aid through the MCA,
and only three of these are projected to be in Africa (Uganda,
Ghana, and Senegal). The eligibility criteria dictated by the U.S.
create relationships with poor countries reminiscent of old-style
imperialism. They also create competition among poor countries for
a portion of the relatively meager MCA funds. This selective
approach to development assistance risks punishing those countries
whose people are the worst off and in greatest need of
international support.
The United Nations continues to
emphasize that African countries will be unable to meet the
Millennium Development Goals without a significant increase in
assistance from rich countries. In June 2004, the G-8 group of
leaders from the world's wealthiest countries will hold its annual
meeting here in the U.S. At the top of the agenda should be a
renewed commitment to support Africa's efforts to fight HIV/AIDS
and poverty. But this is unlikely. Instead, the G-8 meeting will
focus on the priorities of the G-8 countries--military security
and economic growth--emphasizing the huge inequalities in access
to wealth and power in the world today, and the continued neglect
of the global majority by the rich elites that constitute the
ruling minority in this system of global apartheid.
Economic Relations
Total trade between the U.S. and
sub-Saharan Africa dropped considerably in 2002 (the year for
which the most recent figures are available), with a decline in
both imports and exports. Two-way trade totaled about $24 billion,
about 15% less than the previous year. While the 2003 figures are
not yet available, it is clear that Africa has been negatively
impacted by the worldwide economic downturn, as well as by the war
in Iraq, and the continent's economic prospects will remain
unstable in 2004.
By 2003, thirty-eight African
countries had been declared eligible for the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), though only slightly more than half of
these had exported goods under the program by mid-2002. In fact,
AGOA benefits are highly concentrated in a few countries and in
the petroleum and mining sector, and U.S. imports from AGOA have
been predominantly energy-related products. This trend will only
increase now that Angola has been added to the eligible countries
list at the end of 2003. While the Bush administration continues
to promote AGOA as the engine of Africa's economic growth, this is
increasingly contradicted by the reality of the U.S.-Africa trade
profile.
The U.S.-Africa Economic
Cooperation Forum, required under the AGOA legislation, was held
twice in 2003--once in January in Mauritius, after the 2002 Forum
there had been postponed, and once again in December in
Washington, DC. In 2003 also, the U.S. began negotiations on a
free trade agreement with the Southern African Custom Union (SACU).
These negotiations will continue in 2004. Despite such high-level
consultations and new trade arrangements, the current framework of
U.S. economic relations with Africa has brought little benefit to
a few countries, and has failed to promote sustainable economic
growth. Restrictions on African access to U.S. markets, and
agricultural subsidies to U.S. agribusinesses, continue to
undermine Africa 's competitiveness and constrict the continent's
trade-related development.
Meanwhile, African countries
continue to struggle under the crippling burden of some $300
billion of unpayable and illegitimate debt. In 2004, the World
Bank and IMF will mark their 60th anniversary, yet no new
initiative on debt cancellation is likely, and no major reform of
these institutions is planned. The U.S. is the single largest
shareholder in both the World Bank and IMF, to whom most of
Africa's debts are owed, and it could use its power to support the
call for debt cancellation for Africa. This is a matter of justice,
but also a matter of common sense. At the moment, most African
countries are required to spend more on debt service to these
institutions each year than they can spend on the fight against
poverty and HIV/AIDS. As major mobilizations and protests are
planned around the World Bank IMF anniversary this year, the
pressure on the Bush administration to support debt cancellation
for Africa will be greater than ever. This is particularly true in
light of the White House's exceptional efforts to gain the
cancellation of Iraq's foreign debts of some $120 billion.
War, Peace, & Human Rights
In 2003, the crisis in Liberia
provided a clear metaphor for official U.S. disdain for Africa.
Despite unique historic ties and important national interests,
President Bush stalled on this crisis during his visit to Africa,
and was ultimately unwilling to make a commitment to stabilizing
Liberia and supporting its people. In 2004, as Liberia struggles
to find its feet, and as West African countries attempt to
counteract insecurity in the broader region, the U.S. can play a
crucial role; though a real commitment appears unlikely. Congress
did succeed in appropriating $200 million for Liberia in a
supplemental for 2004. But what is needed most from the U.S. is
the political will to vigorously support West African efforts to
stabilize that country and the larger West Africa region.
Elsewhere in Africa in 2003, the
U.S. played a minor role in supporting some of the peacemaking
initiatives of African leaders, including in Sudan. But in
negotiations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and
elsewhere, the U.S. was largely invisible. The Bush administration
remains unwilling to make a commitment to provide sustained
diplomatic and financial support to African efforts to promote
peace and security. In 2004, this “hands off” approach of U.S.
policy is likely to continue. African-led initiatives to address
the continent's conflicts are making important progress below the
radar. U.S. support could do much to bolster these crucial
efforts.
In 2003, the elections in Nigeria
offered a metaphor for the state of democracy across much of the
African continent. While the election was important and in some
measure successful--marking the first democratic transfer of power
in Nigeria 's history--the practice of democracy was far from
perfect. Here, as everywhere, democracy is still a work in
progress. Nigeria still faces serious challenges to its political
stability in the form of an economic crisis and internal divisions
that threaten the country's future.
In Zimbabwe, the political and
economic turmoil continued in 2003, as the Mugabe government came
under increasing pressure from the international community. With
Zimbabwe's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in December 2003,
amidst continuing state violence against government opponents, it
seemed clear that the country's crisis would continue into 2004,
and that the people of Zimbabwe would continue to suffer as a
result. The U.S. and the European Union have imposed sanctions on
the Mugabe regime, but have failed to develop a strategy to
address the roots of Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis, and
to foster a democratic solution. African states, with South Africa
foremost among them, have similarly failed to create momentum for
a peaceful solution.
In 2003, at a summit of the Heads
of State of the African Union, African leaders adopted the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa . The adoption of this new
instrument strengthened the main African human rights charter with
provisions on women's rights. It was a significant development,
reflecting the growing commitment to address the discrimination
and human rights violations suffered by women in Africa, and
elsewhere. African women continue to suffer human rights abuses in
many parts of the continent, and in 2003 there were increasing
reports of rape being used as a weapon of war in conflicts in
Africa and other parts of the world. In 2004, it is hoped that the
new Protocol on women's rights in Africa will be ratified quickly
by African states. For its part, the U.S. has yet to ratify the
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). This is a step the U.S. should take immediately to show
its support for women's rights and gender equality.
Oil & Strategic Military
Relations
Under the Bush administration, the
real priorities in U.S. Africa policy are oil and strategic
military relations, and this will continue to be the case in 2004.
The Bush administration will continue to deal with Africa on its
own terms, and its policies will be driven by its interests in
these areas in the context of the “war on terrorism.”
In recent years, the U.S. has
become increasingly interested in African oil resources as an
alternative to the Middle East , and the U.S. now defines African
oil as a strategic national interest. The U.S. preoccupation with
“energy security” makes certain African countries--like
Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon--important sources of oil. At present,
sub-Saharan Africa supplies almost one-fifth of U.S. oil imports.
The National Intelligence Council projects that U.S. oil supplies
from West Africa will increase to 25% by 2015. This would surpass
U.S. oil imports from the entire Persian Gulf. Studies indicate
that the greatest increase in oil production globally in the next
decade is likely to come from West Africa, and the U.S. is
following this trend closely. In 2004, U.S. policies will continue
to further its plans to secure access to this oil supply.
Increased U.S. interest in
projecting military force into the Persian Gulf has led to a
massive increase in the U.S. military presence in the Horn of
Africa, and elsewhere. The Bush administration is concerned with
the counter-terrorism efforts of African countries, to the extent
that they provide security for U.S. interests. In June 2003, Bush
announced a new $100 million initiative to help East African
countries increase their counter-terrorism efforts. In 2004, U.S.
preoccupation with security in Africa is sure to continue. While
it remains uncertain whether or not the U.S. will establish a
military base on the island of Sao Tome & Principe, as was
rumored last year, it is certain that U.S. relations with Africa
will become increasingly militarized, with a focus on energy
security and terrorism concerns.
The trend that has become apparent
since 2001, with these two agendas--oil security and
counter-terrorism--forming the backbone of U.S. Africa policy
under the Bush administration, will be further reinforced in 2004.
Conclusion
While the HIV/AIDS crisis remains
the most urgent global threat, the current orientation of the Bush
administration indicates that little progress will be made here in
2004. As the U.S. presidential election looms at the end of the
year, it remains to be seen whether an alternative candidate can
successfully articulate a different vision of U.S. global
leadership, more responsive to international challenges. Under the
current administration, U.S. Africa policy is unlikely to address
these most pressing African and global priorities.
Salih Booker
is Executive Director, and Ann-Louise Colgan is Assistant
Director for Policy
Analysis & Communications, at Africa Action. This report
is published jointly with Foreign
Policy in Focus, where this article was originally published.
Thanks to http://www.guerrillanews.com
|
