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The Post-election Violence in
Kenya:An overview of the underlying factors
Part one of Three
Antony Otieno Ong’ayo (2008-02-14)
Historical and political dimensions
Recent political problems that threaten to tear Kenya apart
require analysis that goes beyond ethnicity as portrayed in the
media and current analyses that attempt to explain the situation.
More correctly, emphasis and focus should be placed on the
interpenetration of historical and current political developments
whose origins can be traced in the early stages of state formation
in Kenya. In 19th century the area that became Kenya could be
described as stateless, but was made up of various nationalities (currently
considered sub-nationalities if seen from the eye of British
Historians and ethnographers). Some commentators have claimed that
peoples' civility, and ethnicity was shaped by their subsistence
farming or herding, or some mixture of both".
However what ethnographers and Eurocentric commentators ignore is
that there was clear territorial ownership of space by each
“nation” even though at times there were conflicts over pasture
and adventurer expeditions into the regions occupied by other
groups. In the late 19th century most of the people of Kenya
resisted British conquest, and land grabbing when white
settlements began in the fertile highlands of Rift Valley and
central province. Administrative structures were designed and
to-date, have been effectively used as part of state machinery to
impose illegitimate authority on the people. Besides land, there
were conflicts over forced “labour” (basically Africans and latter
Indians) and hut tax. These conflicts led to the 1923 Devonshire
White paper, which stated that ‘Kenya is an African country and
the interest of the natives must be paramount’. The Africans
especially the Kikuyu in Central province, Masaai and Kalenjin in
the Rift Valley, lost much of their best land to the white
settlers and the growing population meant increasing land hunger
and discontent. A new land redistribution scheme was introduced
under Lyttleton constitution of 1954 followed by other
constitutional changes however these scheme did not adequately
address the land question.
Nationalism in Kenya begun as early as 1922. Violence and armed
struggle was led by the Mau Mau and by 1955, 13,000 Africans had
lost their lives (see Anderson, 2007). In the early 1960s, Moi,
Muliro and Ngala of KADU supported regionalism against Kenyatta,
Odinga and Mboya and KANU's nationalism (associated with the
centralised system). By 1960, two national parties were formed (what
could be described as the first multi party era in Kenya). These
two parties were already divided over the type of system that
would serve the African interests. Alliance by leadings lights
from various groups which made up KADU and KANU respectively, also
played out in the struggles for release of those in detention and
efforts to form the first government. The British were forced to
retreat from Kenya and subsequently, release Jomo Kenyatta from
detention at Kapenguria.
When Kenya gained “independence” from Britain in 1963, it
inherited non-democratic institutions and cultures, which later
fell into the hands of corrupted politicians and governments. This
exemplifies the de-colonization programme that retained the
colonial apparatuses of security forces and political repression
in the post-colony (see Anderson, 1998) and compromise over the
land question. Post-colonial “officials” lavished themselves with
political and economic favours in a pattern that has extended into
the post-post-colonial era (Moi who was a member of KADU and later
KANU, Kibaki who was technocrat in KANU from 1963, Michuki the
Internal Security Minister, Njenga Karume, the Defence Minister
among others). This process has been captured by some analysts who
have pointed out that these developments mirrors what was a
distinctly colonial view of the rule of law, which saw the British
leave behind legal systems that facilitated tyranny, oppression
and poverty rather than open, accountable government(Elkins,
2007/8)
Ethnic composition and competitive politics
While national level political competition in Kenya is often
misunderstood and shallowly interpreted in terms of a competition
between the Kikuyu and the Luo, most commentators on Kenya’s
politics do ignore the position and role of the Kalenjin, Luhya,
Kamba, Kisii, Coastal peoples (Mijikenda), Swahili, Arabs, Indians
and Europeans who live in large farms/ranches and important urban
areas in Kenya. Each of these groups subsumes a number of smaller
ethnic units that become relevant bases of social identity in more
localized settings. The groups hardly mentioned are the Ogieks,
and the Jemps who are the original occupants of some parts of
present Rift valley but have since been displaced or evicted to
create room for current occupants. What is however neglected in
the debate about Kenyan politics is the reality that all groups
have a stake in the running of the Kenyan polity, but due to
systematic exclusion of some groups from the national leadership,
competitive politics in Kenya is bound to have an ethnic dimension
When Kenya became a one-party state in 1969 Kenyatta ruled the
country with a clique around him mainly from his ethnic Kikuyu,
who eventually alienated other groups in Kenya from the political
and economic order for his entire reign (1963-1978). Although
Kenyatta did not instigate ethnic clashes, he targeted eminent
persons from ethnic groups that he felt were a threat to his
leadership. Many people were assassinated including Pio Gama Pinto
(Kenyan Indian), JM Kariuki (Kikuyu) Tom Mboya, D.O Makasembo,
Arwgings Kodhek (all Luo) Ronald Ngala (Mijikenda of Coast),
Seroney (Kalenjin) among others. This was a strategy that Moi also
adopted at the height of his reign when prominent persons were
assassinated or died in mysterious circumstances. They include,
Robert Ouko, Owiti Ongili, Otieno Ambala, Hezekiah Oyugi (all Luo)
Bishop Kipsang Muge, (Kalenjin), Adungosi and Muliro (all Luhya,).
Many students, journalists, lecturers, and politicians like Raila
Odinga, Charles Rubia, Keneth Matiba, Martin Shikuku, among others
were also detained and tortured. What is also missing in most
analyses is the role of other communities during the struggle for
independence, while the Mau Mau has been presented as the
epicentre of everything around impendence struggle, but historical
facts point to other contributions but because this ignorance has
been presented as the truth, coupled with arrogance and
superiority complex, Kenyan liberation history has been constantly
distorted.
The struggles for political ascendancy begun immediately after the
postcolonial government were formed. While the first cabinet was
quite representative of the face of Kenya, soon ideological
difference, impact of cold war and betrayal on key issues cropped
in, thus dividing the original personalities in the independence
struggle; the Mau Mau veterans were sidelined and politics of
exclusion and elimination begun with earnest, sometimes combined
with assassinations. Electoral politics never took shape in a
democratic sense since Kenyatta who ruled mainly through the
provincial administration, outside the KANU framework, rendered
the party system that could have rallied the people around issues
and programmes meaningless. Fears of ethnic ascendancies,
power-hungry ethnic political elites, undemocratic processes and
institution, which are all hallmarks of today's Kenya, begun to
play out; a confirmation of the undemocratic historical trajectory
that Kenya has been moving along. The 2007 election fiasco has
exposed the deliberate stoking of ethnic tension by power-hungry
elites, feeble democratic traditions and institutions in Kenya,
one that threatens to consume it if not adequately addressed.
Electoral politics
Electoral politics in Kenya can also be understood best by looking
at the role of the process and institutions charged with
overseeing such a process. The electoral system in Kenya is based
on constituencies whose boundaries are congruent with the
boundaries of tribal areas. These boundaries have been used to
manipulate democratic outcomes. The constituencies are represented
by a member of parliament and a number of local authority
representatives at ward, town and urban council levels. Their
election takes place at the same time as that of presidential and
parliamentary ones. The boundaries are determined by the electoral
commission if there is evidence that populations have outgrown the
current demarcations. This decision is however made by the
electoral commission without consulting the local communities and
in most cases at the directive of the president. The president
without parliamentary approval appoints the Commission. However
the problem with numbers in Kenyan politics is that they are never
correct or close to truth. This originates from history of
manipulation of constituency population numbers during the single
party era, but also lack of regular census and update of births
and deaths records. It is therefore not surprising to see “ghost
names” in voter registers (not deleted even after a whole five
year preparation and multibillion investment in the process) or to
see number of registered voters increase during presidential vote
tallying contrary to the actual number at constituency level or
previous attempt to create extra constituencies in the incumbent
friendly regions in order to meet the 25% constitutional
requirement for presidential eligibility.
But the problem with the electoral process did not start in recent
years; the political competition that followed immediately after
independence gave birth to the mechanisations, manipulation of the
institutions responsible for electoral process and the blatant
rape of the constitution to suit those in power. This begun with
the erosion of the party system, when immediately after
independence in 1963, the political alliances begun to fall apart
with KADU joining KANU and internal struggles within KANU leading
to the formation of KPU. Although the fall out between Kenyatta
and Odinga has been described as ideological, the actual cause was
the feeling that Kenyatta had betrayed his colleagues and the
entire nation on three crucial promises at independence, namely
eradication of poverty, illiteracy and disease. Kenyatta betrayed
this cause by allocating huge parcels of land left by white
settlers to himself and cronies, including large tracts in the
present Rift Valley province.
Upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi, a member of the
Kalenjin, assumed power in 1978. During his 24 year reign, Moi
exploited the Kenyan diversity and politicised ethnicity to levels
where he could instigate clashes in districts and provinces with
mixed groups, a practice he perfected in the 90’s in order to
discredit the onset of multiparty democracy in Kenya. Politically
motivated ethnic clashes were used to disrupt and displace
populations and groups that supported the opposition (mainly the
Kikuyu in Rift Valley, Luo in the slums of Nairobi and Mombasa).
He also used divide and rule tactics, pitting on group against
another and at times bought politician through patronage in order
to have more support in parliament. These tactics ensured that
that the opposition lost the elections of 1992 and 1997. It was
not until 2002, when his constitutional terms in office expired
that he had no options, but also due to the unity of the
opposition through NARC (Rainbow coalition of Kijana Wamalwa FORD-
Kenya, Raila Odinga of LDP, Charity Ngilu and Kibaki of NAK/DP)
got together and managed to defeated Moi’s preferred choice of
successor, Uhuru Kenyatta (the son of Jomo Kenyatta). Moi was
voted out of office in 2002, and Kibaki became president.
Anger against Kibaki’s leadership is real and genuine and it stems
from the fact that Kibaki was elected on a platform of reform, in
the sphere of constitutional change, end to corruption, tribalism
and establishment of an equitable system that could uplift the
living conditions of all Kenyans regardless of their ethnicity and
other background factors. Kibaki’s failure to grasp these genuine
concerns, self imprisonment from reasoning and lack of desire to
leave a legacy in Kenya, caused a great anger in the majority of
Kenyans whose hopes had been dashed by Kibaki’s conduct,
corruption and arrogance of people around him. For instance
People’s disgust with Kibaki’s regime was expressed at the 2005
referendum in which the Wako Draft (a diluted version of the
Boma’s draft, which was a constitutional product of a people led
process) was defeated. Seven provinces made up of diverse ethnic
groups voted for “NO” while the Yes vote was only represented by
central province. This outcome reflected the wishes of the
majority and cannot be seen as a vote against the Kikuyu since the
vote was for a devolved system or a unitary system. But then, one
cannot lose sight to the ethnic dimension the vote took during the
campaigns, when people of central province were told to vote for
“Yes” because it meant protecting “their presidency”. This anger
and frustration was captured in the 2007 elections in which Kibaki
lost his close allies from his own backyard (central province) and
high profile lieutenants from other regions who were rejected at
grassroots level. The 2007 elections also saw a new trend of
ethnic alliances, which were formed for political expediency, even
though hidden behind critical issues. Some groups could however
identify with each other in terms of political and economic
marginalisation than others, thus the divide the has been
reflected in the post ethic conflict even if some analysis attempt
to reduce it to the work of political leaders as the ones behind
the ethnic divide. In the current situation, old wounds have been
revived but the degree of suffering under previous regimes differ
from group to group, while frustration also exists within the
groups themselves, whereby, Kalenjin rejected their own, in Moi
and his sons, while the Kikuyu rejected the cabal that have
surrounded Kibaki since 2002. The same was witnessed in Nyanza
where Luo and Kisii Nyanza voted out MPs that they thought did not
deserve another parliamentary mandate.
* Antony Otieno Ong’ayo is a researcher at the Transnational
Institute, Amsterdam.
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