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China's influence stokes Kenya's
hatred of SA
IOL
February 16 2008
By Fiona Forde
The diplomatic chasm between Kenya and South Africa is as wide
open today as it was a fortnight ago when the government of Mwai
Kibaki said it would not trust Cyril Ramaphosa as an honest broker
in the African Union-mandated peace talks.
They impugned his impartiality by citing financial links with
opposition leader Raila Odinga, forcing the 55-year-old Ramaphosa
to withdraw his name from the negotiations and return home within
four days of his arrival.
Ramaphosa took the rebuke with characteristic dignity. Although he
left little doubt he has no ties, financial or otherwise, with any
member of Kenya's political fraternity, he agreed that while there
is no trust, there can be no meaningful dialogue.
In his wake blazed a trail of speculation about why he was really
ousted. It became apparent that Odinga was not a factor. It was
mooted that it had less to do with Ramaphosa and more to do with
Kibaki trying to derail the talks.
But the ostensible reason for the rebuttal had the makings of a
bilateral breakdown: SA was simply not welcome.
Although the former negotiator had travelled to Nairobi in his
personal capacity on the invitation of Kofi Annan, as a
high-ranking member of the ANC he was widely seen as someone close
to the Union Buildings, which sits on the other side of the chasm.
"It's political antipathy that dates back to the days of apartheid,"
explains David Ndii, a Nairobi-based economist.
The Kenyan establishment, during the governments of John Kenyatta
and Daniel arap Moi, was never too forthcoming in its support of
the ANC when the comrades needed it most, he argues.
The prospect of brokering a peace deal might have been a feather
in Ramaphosa's cap that would have added to his negotiating
achievements. But not in Kenya's, it would seem, as SA is seen as
a relative newcomer in African diplomatic circles, a minion that
has yet to earn its might in the eyes of early-independence
nations.
Prior to 1994, Kenya and Nigeria were the grown-ups on the
continent, Ndii explains, and the thought now of the 45-year-old
East African country having to pay lip service to the 14-year-old
southern neighbour didn't bode well.
"Kenya had been much more influential, and more diplomatically
respected, than South Africa on the continent for many years, so
there's an element of pride to this," he suggests.
"There's been a bit of a contest for diplomatic recognition, if
you like, and South Africa was not going to be allowed to elbow
its way in."
Although the younger of the democracies, there is a rising level
of animosity towards SA as the new hegemonic force, the major
economic power - "the America of Africa", in the words of Simon
Freemantle, a senior business analyst at Emerging Markets
consulting firm in Joburg.
Hence, when Pretoria broke with its policy of "quiet diplomacy"
and stated in no uncertain terms that it would not embrace
Kibaki's victory in light of the disputed results, the Kenyan
government squirmed.
It became a sore point that has a lot to do with what Gladwell
Otieno, the head of the Africa Centre for Open Governance, calls
the "big man syndrome".
"Like [Zimbabwean President Robert] Mugabe, Mwai Kibaki did not
want to be told what to do by South Africa.
"South Africa takes a strong stance on democratisation and human
rights and has been at the forefront of a push for greater
transparency on the continent. But in Kenya we have a government
who have stolen an election," she says.
The two things combined created an uncomfortable situation.
"We all had great hope in Ramaphosa. He's a principled man - but
there was a feeling that South Africa would be opposed to a
takeover of power which is not clearly democratic and
constitutional.
Kibaki was paranoid that he would pull a rabbit out of the hat in
terms of a negotiated solution." SA got a "bloody nose" before he
could even try.
But this chasm goes beyond diplomacy and stretches beyond the
borders of Africa. It touches on the issue of former colonial
powers, donors and traditional African allies and investors that
are beginning to wane as China's stake in the country strengthens.
Tired of being preached to by the West about good governance,
democracy and zero tolerance on corruption, Kenya is only too
happy to look to China which preaches a policy of non-interference
in the internal affairs of its partner countries.
Chinese-Kenya relations have flourished since Kibaki came to power
in 2002. Two years earlier, trade between the countries had peaked
at $136-million (R1-billion).
By the end of 2006 it had reached $650-million. Although it is
skewed in China's favour, Beijing's imports from Mombasa have
risen exponentially during the same period. In monetary terms they
have grown by 200 percent in the last five years.
Gateway to wealth
China sees in Kenya a gateway to a region of rich potential. The
port of Mombasa provides a direct route not only to Uganda and
Rwanda, but to the emerging markets of Somalia and southern Sudan,
and China's other strategic places of interest on the continent.
Until now a stable force in a volatile region, it had become an
attractive base from where Chinese firms expanded into Africa.
Kenya has seen in China "a very strong partner that just won't
interfere in our domestic affairs", says Otieno.
"That's not to say the West is entirely without blame, but they do
have a democratic pubic back home who are interested in what's
happening with their money and who in the past have pushed for
anti-corruption."
As a result, Kenya has been able to play off its suitors like
never before.
Although some Kenyan analysts refer to China as the "ravenous
rottweiler", in trading terms, the figures speak for themselves.
SA, on the other hand, is like a shih tzu in comparison.
There are more than 30 South African companies trading in Kenya.
But their footprint is light compared to the inroads other South
African firms and investment interests have made elsewhere on the
continent, particularly in Southern Africa.
That said, in recent times, South African firms have struggled to
make headway in Kenya. Freemantle, and many more like him, often
cite the case of South African Breweries, a company that had
bought out a number of other interests on the continent before it
arrived in Nairobi, where it encountered the East Africa Breweries,
which put an instant halt to its gallop.
"Kenyans take some pride in the fact that they refused to let
South Africa, a major power, take control there," Otieno says.
Many talk of the black brothers' arrogance. They say they arrive
in Nairobi dressed up in white men's suits and are not welcome
when they begin to throw their weight around.
But to suggest that the Kenya-SA divide has anything to do with
favouring Chinese interests oversteps the point, in Freemantle's
view.
"China's entry into Kenya is relatively recent and the country is
still heavily reliant on the UK as a trading partner, as well as
the billions of shillings that are sent home from there each year
in the form of remittances."
If anything, the crisis could work in SA's favour, he argues.
"Asian companies who have been weighing up the benefits of
entering the DRC and Zambia, either through Durban or Mombasa,
could begin to look to South Africa," he believes, although it
will take quite some time before the effects of such a decision
could be felt.
However, China's presence cannot be dismissed so lightly in the
current climate. Nor can Beijing's ability to turn a blind eye to
the blatant rigging at the polls.
As the world's leading heads of state spoke out against Kibaki's
stolen victory, China boldly argued that democracy is not an
African concept.
"Western-style democratic theory simply isn't suited to African
conditions," the Communist Party stated.
The blame lies with the West, China believes, for tyrannically
imposing Western democratic systems after independence.
Your money is our business but your politics is your own, is
China's underlying message. With China-Africa trade valued at
$70-billion and set to rise to $100-billion by 2010, they are
words of cold comfort for a troubled continent.
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