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Kenya's quicksands
Cameron Duodu
February 1, 2008
Even as the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon, joins
the diplomatic efforts of his predecessor, Kofi Annan, to try and
get the politicians of Kenya to resolve the current crisis through
dialogue, the situation on the ground in the country is fast
disappearing from the control of the politicians.
The ethnic genie is truly out of the bottle and fuels its
monstrous thirst for blood on anything dramatic that happens. For
instance, the murder, within days of each other, of two members of
the new parliament - Melitus Mugabe Were and David Kumutai Too -
has reinforced the belief among non-Kikuyus that Kibaki and his "Kikuyu
gang" will stop at nothing to hold on to power.
True, the murders have tilted the balance of power in the new
parliament in favour of Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and
the parties "friendly" to it. They now boast of a majority 103
seats against 101 held by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).
The ODM leader, Raila Odinga, has described one of the murders as
a "planned political assassination", and going by the litmus test
of cui bono (who benefits), it is difficult not to agree with his
interpretation.
But to his followers, a far more sinister perception of the
murders offers itself - namely, confirmation that Kibaki and his
supporters are a power-hungry bunch who want to monopolise
political control in Kenya by any means, fair and foul. Whether
any actual evidence exists to justify such a conclusion (or not)
doesn't matter in the current political climate. For the police
and the judiciary are as much under the cloud of suspicion as the
politicians. At least 50% of Kenya's population, if not more, now
ardently believe that Kikuyus want total control of Kenya.
And they have been reacting against this Kikuyu "plot" in a manner
that has led some observers, including the US assistant secretary
of state for African affairs, Jendayi Frazer, to conclude that "ethnic
cleansing" is taking place in many areas of Kenya. (Her
characterisation of the crisis in these terms has since been
repudiated by the state department.)
But it is indisputable that the Kalenjin and the Luo, among others,
are expelling the Kikuyus from what they consider to be their "ancestral
land". Some of this land, they claim, was distributed to Kikuyus
by the Kikuyu politicians who ruled the country after independence.
On the other hand, in Kikuyu areas, ethnic groups known to support
the ODM are fleeing, afraid that the Kikuyus will reap vengeance
for what is happening to Kikuyus elsewhere. It's become a classic
case of the onset of national disintegration. The number of
displaced people is now estimated to be at least 500,000. Some are
finding safety in prisons; many more are in tents provided by the
UN, where their safety is anything but guaranteed. Everywhere, it
is suffering, suffering, suffering.
Meanwhile, the country is awash with rumours of people arming
themselves for civil war. No proof of weapons-buying is offered,
of course, but such rumours tend to feed upon themselves: since it
stands to reason for ethnic groups threatened by others to defend
themselves with weapons, the rumours must be true. And if they are
true, then the ones being threatened with weapons must also arm
themselves.
Kenya is in an area where weapons are, in theory, easy to procure
- from anarchic Somalia, principally, but also from Uganda and as
far away as Eritrea and Sudan. So the seriousness of the situation
cannot be over-emphasised.
Can negotiations of the sort Ban, Annan and their colleagues are
carrying out provide a solution? Success would depend on a deal
that can be sold to the populace as a guaranteed path to economic
equality. It would have to be seen as making it impossible for one
ethnic group to be favoured above others in terms of important
appointments (especially in ministerial office). But above all, an
independent, inter-ethnic commission would have to be appointed to
look into the question of land redistribution.
Such a commission must be given power to order that questionable
titles held as a result of past political patronage be revoked,
and ownership reverted to those who can prove that their ancestors
held the land before colonial fiat turned them over to absentee
landlords and nouveau-riche landgrabbers who had political
leverage.
Even if such a rearrangement of Kenya's socio-economic landscape
were to be agreed upon, the political antagonists would have their
work cut out to get their followers to accept it as the basis for
future co-existence. The trouble is that ethnic politics tends to
operate under eternal suspicion - suspicion that, in the worlds of
an African proverb, "there is always blood in the head of a
tse-tse fly".
This is why it is totally treasonable for African politicians to
play with the ethnic sensibilities of their people. Biafra (1967),
the Ivory Coast (2002) and, of course, Sudan (since 1984) are
among the more sanguine examples of what can happen when the greed
for power blinds politicians to the realities of life among the
people they claim to lead. But who cares for the lessons of
history when the lust for power beckons?
It is now up to the entire world to pressurise Kenya's leaders to
recognise the
quicksand into which they have pushed their country and to
retreat before they find themselves unable either to go forward or
to turn back.
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